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ABSTRACT 
Corporate governance is an internal system encompassing policies, processes and people, which 
serves the needs of shareholders and other stakeholders, by directing and controlling management 
activities with good business savvy, objectivity, accountability and integrity. In the case of gov-
ernment-owned companies orderly operation and management is crucial, since they are spending 
the property of the tax-payers. In the greatest corporate scandal in Hungary, that of the BKV mil-
lions of Euros were wasted on fictious services. The case has several considerations on corporate 
governance regulation and practice in Hungary. In my paper, as a case study, I present the corpo-
rate governance system of the BKV and analyze the responsibilities concerning the BKV scandals 
from an organizational point of view. 
1. INTRODUCTION: BKV AND THE BKV SCANDAL 
BKV is a closed company limited by shares, with the Metropolitan Government as its 
founder and owner (shareholder). It is in charge of public transport of the capital and its 
surroundings, operating five large sections of public transport (bus, tram, subway, subur-
ban railway line, trolleybus) in an integrated system. The fleet of BKV vehicles accom-
plish nearly 1.4 billion passenger rides annually. The capital of BKV amounts to HUF 127 
billion, registered in shares. The company faces financial difficulties, its revenues do not 
provide sufficient coverage for its expenditures. In 2008, the balance sheet loss of BKV 
amounted to HUF 5.7 billion, its operation could only be maintained through taking up a 
credit (HUF 4.5 billion in total) and utilizing considerable state subsidy (HUF 70.5 billion). 
In December 2008, the company received a single-sum reimbursement from the state, 
which amounted to HUF 10 billion. The price supplement granted was over HUF 17 bil-
lion (source: BKV Annual Report for 2008). At present, BKV has a total external debt of 
90 billion forints, with the company's estimated internal debt amounting to HUF 350-700 
billion (source: Report of the Commission of Inquiry of the Metropolitan General Assem-
bly). 
Starting from 2007, a number of scandals related to BKV have occurred. They may be 
assigned to two groups: those concerning the salaries and severance pay of top employees, 
and those associated with consultation and other contracts. Several people are now under 
arrest charged with embezzlement because they had concluded contractors' and service 
agreements on behalf of BKV, despite its loss-making operation, for the provision of un-
justified and unnecessary services, or endorsed performance thereof, thereby causing the 
transport company damage to property amounting to more than HUF 100 million. Also 
several people have been arrested because of the salaries and severance payments. Extra 
payments were made on 48 occasions and the company suffered a damage amounting to 
around half a billion HUF. 
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2. CASE STUDY 
2.1. Corporate governance of BKV 
The owner 
In accordance with Act no. IV of 2006 on Business Associations, the supreme body of a 
company limited by shares is the general meeting. However, no general meeting functions 
in the event of a single-member company limited by shares, and the sole member is enti-
tled to decide, through written resolutions, on all issues falling within the competence 
specified in the deed of foundation of the company (source: Act on Business Associations) 
In case of BKV, the body exercising the founding members' rights of a single-member 
closed company limited by shares is the general assembly of the capital city (the "city as-
sembly"), or a committee thereof. The related details of operation of the founding member 
are determined in the rules of organization and operation of the Metropolitan Government 
(the "Metropolitan Government Rules"). 
Since the change of the political regime in 1990, a liberal-social majority has operated 
the Metropolitan Government, with Gibor Demszky being the mayor (Free Liberal Party). 
The recent 66-member board of representatives which was formed after the local govern-
ment elections in 2006, consists of 24 Socialist, 26 Young Democrat, 4 Christian Democ-
rat, 9 Free Liberal, and 3 Hungarian Democratic Forum members (Source: the Metropoli-
tan Government). 
The city assembly as the body exercising the rights and fulfilling the obligations of the 
single-member BKV closed company has transferred the above owner's competence of the 
Metropolitan Government to the Economic Committee of the city assembly in the Rules 
(source: the Metropolitan Government Rules). 
In pursuance of the Act on Business Associations, several rights, among them certain 
rights relevant for the present research, fall within the exclusive competence of the su-
preme body of the company: 
- establishment and modification of the statutes; 
- election, withdrawal, and specification of remuneration of the members of the board 
of directors, the chief executive officer, the members of the supervisory board, and 
the auditors; 
- adoption of the annual report; 
- decision on all issues that fall within the exclusive competence of the general meeting 
in pursuance of the statutes or the law. 
(Source: Act on Business Associations) 
Compared to that set forth in legal regulations, the Deed of Foundation of BKV extends 
the scope of issues falling within the exclusive competence of the founder with the follow-
ing founder's rights that are relevant for the present research: 
- approval of the annual business plans of the company, 
- approval of the rules of operation of the board of directors and the rules of function-
ing of the supervisory board ("SB"). 
- elaboration of the rules regulating the system of remuneration of senior officers and 
top managers of the company (wages, severance pay, other personal payments). 
The founder reviews and evaluates the following documents and/or activities pertaining 
to the present research, and makes the relevant decisions: 
- report of the board of directors on the management of the company during the previ-
ous year, its assets and business policy, 
- report of the SB on the review of the annual report and the proposal regarding the 
utilization of profits, 
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- auditor's report. 
- remuneration of the board of directors, the SB, the auditor, and the chief executive of-
ficer. 
(Source: Deed of Foundation of BKV in the version valid as of April 11, 2010) 
Professional monitoring 
From December 21, 2006, the supervision of public utility companies, business associa-
tions performing public utility activities, and also trust administrator companies owned by 
the capital city, including BKV, were the task of one person, the vice-mayor in charge of 
city operation and trust administration, Mr. Miklós Hagyó (socialist). Starting from March 
06, 2007, these tasks were carried out in conjunction with Mr. Imre Ikvai-Szabó (free lib-
eral), vice-mayor in charge of city development, management, and social policy, in such a 
way that the activities of the above companies solely related to economic management 
were relegated to Mr. Imre Ikvai-Szabó. 
On September 03, 2009, Mr. Miklós Hagyó left his office as the officer in charge of su-
pervision of BKV., and the related roles went over to Mr. Csaba Horváth (socialist), vice-
mayor in charge of Culture and Education. As the socialist-free liberal coalition broke up 
on December 22, 2009, Mr. Imre Ikvai-Szabó remained the only functioning vice-mayor, 
so he took over Csaba Horváth's tasks connected to BKV (see Note I ) (source: Report of 
the city assembly Commission of Inquiry) 
Internal management 
BKV has a two-tier internal management system, that is, the company operates a board 
of directors (executive board) and a supervisory board. 
The board of directors 
The management of a closed company limited by shares may be carried out either by a 
single person, that is, the chief executive officer, or the board of directors as a body. The 
law also provides an opportunity for senior officers to grant the right of representation in 
various matters to certain groups of employees. Pursuant to the Act on Business Associa-
tions, the executive officer of the company exercises the employer's rights vis-à-vis the 
employees of the company. The law also allows exercising the employer's rights to be 
delegated to some employee at a lower level of the working organization. 
As the law provides, the executive officer is required to conduct the management of the 
business association with the increased care generally expected from persons occupying 
such positions, give priority to the interests of the business association, and report to the 
shareholders in the course of fulfilling his duties. The board of directors is required to pre-
pare a report on the management, the financial situation and the business policy of the 
company at the regular intervals set forth in the deed of foundation (statutes), but at least 
once every year for the general meeting, and at least once every three months for the su-
pervisory board. 
According to the ruling of the Act on Business Associations, the board of directors shall 
consist of at least three and at most eleven members. Act no. CXXII of 2009 on the More 
Economical Operation of Publicly Owned Business Associations specifies the number of 
members of the board of directors of closed companies limited by shares as an exception to 
the ruling contained in the Act on Business Associations. It defines the number of mem-
bers of the board of directors to be minimum three and maximum five. If the business as-
sociation concerned qualifies as a company of special importance for the national econ-
omy, the maximum number of the members of the board of directors is limited to seven. 
The particular number of members of the board of directors is fixed, within the confines 
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permitted by law, in the Deed of Foundation of the given company (source: Act on Busi-
ness Associations and Act no. CXX1I of 2009). 
The Deed of Foundation of BKV Zrt. regulates the operation of the board of directors as 
follows: 
The board of directors is the management body of the company which acts as an inde-
pendent body exercising its scope of rights in the course of meetings of the board of direc-
tors. The board of directors consists of 5 to 7 members appointed by the founder. The 
board of directors performs the following duties relevant for the present research: 
- establishment of the business organization of the company 
- passing decisions related to the financial management of the company 
- preparation of business plans and annual reports for the founder 
- preparation of written reports for the founder on the management and operation of the 
company on a semi-annual basis 
- preparation of quarterly reports for the SB on the management and operation of the 
company 
- establishment of the Rules of the company 
- exercising the rights associated with the legal relationship of the chief executive offi-
cer (except those granted to the founder) 
- taking necessary measures that may be required pursuant to assumptions formulated 
by bodies involved in the external or internal control of the company. 
As the task at hand is a public duty and the founder is responsible for the public ser-
vices, and because the owner's participation is vested exclusively in the local government 
of the capital city, the executive officer is obliged to proceed in accordance with the in-
structions of the person acting on behalf of the founder. The founder is entitled to withdraw 
or limit the executive officer's competence (source: Deed of Foundation of BKV in the 
version valid as of April 11, 2010). 
The Supervisory Board 
The basic duty of the SB is to monitor the management of the company in the founders' 
interests, and is liable for its activity towards the shareholders. In accordance with the pro-
visions of the Act on Business Associations regarding the number of the members of the 
supervisory board, the supervisory board may consist of at least three and at most fifteen 
members. Act no. CXXII of 2009 on the More Economical Operation of Publicly Owned 
Business Associations has reduced the number of members of the supervisory board of 
publicly owned companies as well: in case the registered capital of the company exceeds 
two hundred million HUF, that number may vary between three and six members. The 
order of operation of the supervisory board is approved by the supreme body of the com-
pany. 
The Act on Business Associations regulates the operation of supervisory boards as fol-
lows. The board of directors is required to inform the supervisory board on the manage-
ment and the financial situation of the company at least once every three months. The su-
pervisory board may directly inform the owners, by way of a meeting of the supreme body 
of the company, about irregularities and deficiencies established from the reports or re-
vealed in the course of supervision. While performing his supervisory function, a member 
of the supervisory board is entitled to request information from the executive officers or 
the managerial employees of the company. Members of the supervisory board may inspect 
the books and documents of the company, review and investigate them. As a most impor-
tant security and a major regulation for the protection of public interest, the supreme body 
of the company may pass a resolution regarding the adoption of the annual report prepared 
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by the board of directors in compliance with the provisions of the act on accounting only in 
possession of the written report of the supervisory board. If, in the judgment of the super-
visory board, the activity of the executive officers is contrary to the law, the deed of foun-
dation or the resolutions of the general meeting, or otherwise infringes on the interests of 
the company or its members, the supervisory board has the right to call an extraordinary 
meeting of the supreme body (general meeting) and simultaneously propose its agenda 
(source: Act on Business Associations). 
As regards BKV, there are several legal provisions which make the establishment of the 
SB mandatory. The SB consists of 3 to 6 members. Two-thirds of the members arc ap-
pointed by the founder, and one-third is elected by the plant council from among the em-
ployees. 
The Deed of Foundation of BKV regulates the operation of the SB in the areas relevant 
for the present research in the following way. The SB is required to supervise the manage-
ment of the company and its business policy decisions for the founder on a regular basis. 
The founder may pass a valid resolution on the annua! report and the appropriation of af-
ter-tax profits only in possession of the findings of the supervision of the SB. The auditor 
is obligated to inform the founder and the SB if he leams about a fact that appears to con-
firm the responsibility of the executive officer or the members of the SB. The supervisory 
board is entitled to request a report or information from the executive officers or the mana-
gerial employees of the company. The requested report or information shall be provided to 
the SB within a period of fifteen days. The SB has the right to inspect the books, docu-
ments, and petty cash of the company at any time, if necessary, through the inclusion of 
experts. Members of the SB are obliged to perform their duties with the care generally ex-
pected from persons occupying such positions. They are liable to the company in accor-
dance with the rules of civil law for damages caused to such by violation of their duties 
(source: Deed of Foundation of BKV in the version valid as of April 11, 2010). 
The management 
The management of BKV. is in charge of the daily operation of the company. In accor-
dance with the rules of organization and operation, the management is comprised of the 
following offices: 
- the chief executive officer, 
- the deputy chief executive officers. 
(Source: Report of the city assembly Commission of Inquiry) 
The chief executive officer is a member of the board of directors. As the manager in 
charge of the business organization, he exercises the employer's rights, which he may 
transfer to other managers of the business organization (source: Deed of Foundation of 
BKV in the version valid as of April 11, 2010). 
The chief executive officer of the company — both as a member of the board of direc-
tors and as the person entitled to use the chief executive officer's title — is appointed and 
commissioned exclusively by the founder, who is also exclusively entitled to decide on his 
withdrawal and the establishment of his remuneration. All other rights in respect of the 
legal relationship of the chief executive officer are exercised by the board of directors as an 
independent body. 
The scope of competence of the chief executive officer as a senior officer is specified in 
the Rules. In accordance with the relevant provisions, the chief executive officer is em-
powered to establish the detailed rules of organization and operation of the business or-
ganization within the confines of the Rules. The Rules sets out the major authorizations of 
the chief executive officer, viz., the right to make decisions and measures individually in 
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any matters not falling within the exclusive competence of the owner or the executive body 
of the company, and also to assign any decisions and measures in the business organization 
to his own sphere of competence (source: Report of the city assembly Commission of In-
quiry). 
The following persons were chief executive officers of BKV in the period of this re-
search: 
Botond Aba, from July 01, 1993 to December 31, 2006; Attila Antal, from January 01, 
2007 to April 15, 2008; Zsolt Balogh (appointed chief executive officer), from February 
19, 2008 to December 31, 2008; Dr. István Kocsis, from September 01, 2008 on (source: 
Deed of Foundation of BKV in the version valid as of April 11, 2010). 
The tasks and competence of the deputy chief executive officers are regulated in the 
Rules. In the period under review, the following positions of deputy chief executive officer 
existed at BKV (which changed frequently, on a total of 4 occasions during the three-year 
period): deputy chief executive officer in charge of transport, deputy chief executive offi-
cer in charge of financial management, deputy chief executive officer in charge of invest-
ment and public procurement, deputy chief executive officer in charge of DBR Subway, 
deputy chief executive officer in charge of technical issues, deputy chief executive officer 
in charge of sales and communication, general and technical deputy chief executive officer 
(source: Report of the city assembly Commission of Inquiry) 
The auditor 
The auditor is appointed by the founder for a period of 4 years. The board of directors 
proposes the person to be appointed as the auditor, upon the approval of the supervisory 
board. The auditor reviews all annual reports and any other reports submitted to the foun-
der, for their compliance with reality and legality. The auditor may inquire about the man-
agement of the company. The auditor is obliged to inform both the founder and the SB if 
he leams about a fact that appears to confirm the responsibility of an executive officer or 
the members of the SB regarding an issue. In the period under review, the auditor of BKV 
was the Deloitte Ltd. (source: Deed of Foundation of BKV in the version valid as of April 
11,2010). 
2.2. Authorities and responsibilities in the BKV scandals 
Corporate governance is an internal system encompassing policies, processes and peo-
ple, which serve the needs of shareholders and other stakeholders, by directing and control-
ling management activities with good business savvy, objectivity, accountability and integ-
rity. Sound corporate governance is reliant on external marketplace commitment and legis-
lation, plus a healthy board culture which safeguards policies and processes. (O'Donovan, 
2003) Corporate governance ensures that boards are able to exercise appropriate scrutiny 
over management and that shareholders, as owners of the company, are able to hold boards 
accountable. (Angyal 2001) As such, a high level of corporate governance contributes sig-
nificantly to investors' confidence and market stability, thus fostering business efficiency. 
(Frydman-Rapaczynski 1994) 
Appropriate financial management is of special importance in case of companies fi-
nanced by public money, since such firms spend Hungarian taxpayers' money. Accord-
ingly, it is crucial for such companies that the activity of their management is appropriately 
controlled both internally and externally, in the direct interest of the owner municipality 
and also the taxpayers financing them indirectly. 
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In theory, the Act on Business Associations provides for the control over the operation 
of the companies by clearly identifying the responsibilities and scopes of action of the 
management, the supervisory board, and the owner. The system, however, failed to func-
tion appropriately in practice in the case of BKV. On the one hand, the bodies that are in 
charge of controlling the management of the company failed to detect and/or prevent wast-
ing taxpayers' moneys both inside and outside the company. On the other hand, one cannot 
exclude the possibility that the owner's representative abused of the owner's rights and 
interfered with the company's internal operation with the purpose to acquire moneys for 
himself, rather than safeguard public moneys. 
The SB claims they had no information about the agreements that were disadvantageous 
for BKV, and the law does not provide the supervisory board with sufficient room for ma-
noeuvring. In line with the ruling of the Act on Business Associations, the board of direc-
tors is required to prepare a report on the management, the financial situation and the busi-
ness policy of the company for the supervisory board at least once every three months. 
Each member of the supervisory board is entitled to request information from the executive 
officers or the managerial employees of the company. Members of the supervisory board 
may inspect the books and documents of the company, review and investigate them. If the 
supervisory board finds that some activity is contrary to the law or there is some deficiency 
in the operation of the company, it may notify the owners accordingly. All these opportuni-
ties granted in the Act on Business Associations would have enabled the SB to supervise 
the operation of the company more strictly, detect the abuse, and notify the owner. The 
case at hand does not represent an anomaly of the relevant regulations, rather, it is a case 
where the SB failed to use the authorization granted to it and did not meet its obligation set 
forth in the Deed of Foundation of BKV: „to supervise, on a regular basis, the management 
of the company and its business policy decisions", and „members of the SB shall conduct 
their duties with the care generally expected from persons occupying such positions." 
The owner also referred to its lack of awareness of the things going on at BKV. Accord-
ing to the ruling of the Act on Business Associations, specification of remuneration of the 
members of the board of directors and the chief executive officer fall within the exclusive 
competence of the supreme body of the company, thus it is difficult to see why city assem-
bly did not know about the severance paid to the chief executive officers. Pursuant to the 
Deed of Foundation of BKV, approval of the annual business plan of the company, review 
and adoption or rejection of the report of the board of directors on management and busi-
ness policy, as well as adoption of the report of the supervisory board and the auditors also 
fall within the exclusive competence of the supreme body of the company. In addition, 
decisions regarding issues which the statutes refer to the exclusive competence of the gen-
eral assembly also fall within the exclusive competence of the supreme body of the com-
pany. Consequently, the city assembly may have reserved the right of decision in any of 
the issues raised. That would have enabled the owner to impose more stringent control 
over the operation of the company and, thus, identify cases of abuse and put an end to 
them. In other words, here, too, the case has nothing to do with any anomaly of the rele-
vant regulations, rather, it is a case where the owner failed to use the authorization granted 
to it. 
As far as the other aspect of the issue at hand, that is, the owner's interference with the 
operation of BKV for its own purposes is concerned, the underlying regulation appears to 
raise problems. As the Deed of Foundation of BKV rules, the owner is responsible for the 
provision of public services, and, since only the local government has an owner's partici-
pation. the executive officer is obligated to proceed in accordance with the instructions of 
the person representing the founder. This ruling formulated in a general manner in practice 
allows the owner to manually control the day-to-day operation and administration of the 
company, thereby releasing the company management all of its responsibility. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS 
It follows from the above considerations that the inappropriate functioning of the SB is 
related to the poor performance of its members, rather than to a deficiency in legal regula-
tions. Consequently, the present practice of delegating party representatives as members to 
the supervisory boards of publicly owned companies deserves reconsideration. As a more 
appropriate solution, members in such bodies should be dedicated and qualified experts 
who are, at least formally, independent of the parties, and capable of, and dedicated to, 
exercising the necessary control over the management of the companies. 
It also follows from the above that it was due to distorted application of the law, rather 
than to some deficiency in legal regulations, that the owner's control turned into represen-
tation of self-interest instead of protection of the public interest. It appears that the practice 
whereby supervision of companies owned by local governments is performed by a person 
- the vice-mayor - whose education and professional experience surely do not qualify him 
for this position. Furthermore, as such positions are occupied by party representatives, they 
may very likely represent the interests of politics or the party concerned, instead of those of 
the public. 
Another source of problem may be associated with the fact that the composition of the 
general assembly and the related power relations, including the mayor's and his deputies' 
person, would change every four years in line with local government elections or, in case 
of coalition rearrangement, even more frequently. This may give rise to instability of the 
operation of the companies they supervise. Much like in the case of state-owned companies 
where maintenance of their operation is not the duty of the Parliament and its officers and 
committees, but rather the task of the ministries, maintenance of operation of the compa-
nies owned by local governments could be relegated to the competent departments of the 
mayor's office. Expansion of the authorization of the National Audit Office to include 
companies owned by local governments may also be an idea worth considering. It would 
appear appropriate to keep the parties and the politics as far away from the companies as 
possible. 
The deed of foundation of BKV and similar regulations should be modified in such a 
way that executive officers would be required to proceed in accordance with the instruc-
tions representing the owner exclusively in matters within the owner's competence. This 
way, the owner would be prevented from interfering with the operative functioning of the 
company, in addition, scopes of responsibilities and competence would be identified more 
clearly. 
It should not be left to a specific local government or some company regulation (rules of 
organization and operation, coalition agreements, deeds of foundation) to determine who 
and under what kind of authorization should provide for the control of companies of a local 
government on behalf of the owner. This should be regulated uniformly, through the law, 
in a manner that best protects the public interest. 
The method of appointing executive officers for publicly owned companies should also be 
specified in the law (e.g., mandatory international tender), and they should be required to 
meet stringent performance criteria which the SB and the owner should call to account. 
Loop-holes in the public procurement procedures should be eliminated. 
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